- The five pillars are an explanatory model. Information sharing (Article 45) is voluntary and should not be scored as non-compliance.
- An incident is major only if it affects critical services and either involves malicious unauthorised access that may lead to data losses or meets at least two other materiality thresholds.
- The initial notification is due within 4 hours of classifying an incident as major and no later than 24 hours after becoming aware of it.
- Testing is proportionate: systems supporting critical or important functions are tested at least yearly, and TLPT applies only to entities identified by their competent authority.
This page covers what to check in each of DORA's five areas. For scoping, the format for recording each gap and building the remediation roadmap, see our DORA gap analysis guide.
Assessing each of the five areas
Every financial entity outside Article 16 must have a sound, comprehensive and well-documented ICT risk management framework (Article 6), covering identification, protection and prevention, detection, response and recovery, learning and evolving, and communication (Articles 8 to 14). The framework is reviewed at least once a year and after major ICT-related incidents (Article 6(5)); microenterprises review it periodically. Entities covered by Article 16 apply the simplified framework instead.
When assessing your gap on this pillar, work through the following questions:
- Does a documented ICT risk management framework exist, or are your controls informal? Keep it version-controlled so you can show what changed, when and why.
- Does it cover all the functions? Identification (asset inventory, mapping of critical or important functions), protection (access controls, patch management), detection (logging, monitoring), response and recovery (incident handling, backup and restore procedures, RTO/RPO targets).
- Is the management body's role evidenced? Under Article 5(2), the management body defines, approves, oversees and is responsible for the implementation of all arrangements related to the framework, and bears ultimate responsibility for managing ICT risk. That does not mean every document needs separate board approval. It means you can show that the body has approved the framework and the elements Article 5 names, such as the digital operational resilience strategy and the policy on the use of ICT third-party services.
- Is your asset inventory complete? You cannot protect what you have not catalogued. Map all ICT assets supporting critical or important functions, including those hosted by third parties.
- Do your business continuity and recovery plans reflect current infrastructure, and have they been tested? Plans that reference retired systems or untested restore procedures will not stand up to review.
A common finding at this pillar is undocumented practice rather than missing controls: engineers know how the systems work, but there is no written framework a supervisor can assess.
Every financial entity must classify ICT-related incidents and report major ones to its competent authority (Articles 18 and 19). The classification criteria and materiality thresholds are set in Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1772. The test is narrower than many runbooks assume: no single threshold, such as two hours of downtime or impact in two Member States, makes an incident major on its own.
The regulation uses seven criteria (Articles 1 to 7), each with materiality thresholds in Article 9:
Article 8 combines these criteria into a decision:
- Critical services affected? If the incident has not affected critical services (criterion 6), it is not major. Record it anyway, because it may count towards a recurring incident.
- Malicious unauthorised access? If critical services are affected and a successful, malicious and unauthorised access to network and information systems has occurred that may result in data losses, the incident is major.
- Two or more other thresholds? Otherwise, the incident is major only if at least two of the other materiality thresholds are met. One threshold alone is not enough.
- Recurring incidents. Incidents that are not major individually count as one major incident if they occurred at least twice within six months, share the same apparent root cause and together meet the test above. Assess this monthly. This rule does not apply to microenterprises or Article 16 entities.
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/301 sets the reporting time limits in Article 5:
- Initial notification: as early as possible, within 4 hours of classifying the incident as major and no later than 24 hours after becoming aware of it. If the incident is only classified as major more than 24 hours after you became aware of it, the initial notification is due within 4 hours of classification.
- Intermediate report: within 72 hours of the initial notification, even if the status has not changed, with updated reports without undue delay and when regular activities have been recovered.
- Final report: no later than one month after the latest updated intermediate report.
If a deadline falls on a weekend or a bank holiday in your Member State, you may submit by noon on the next working day. That extension does not apply to initial notifications and intermediate reports from credit institutions, central counterparties, operators of trading venues and financial entities identified as essential or important under NIS2, and competent authorities can withdraw it for other significant or systemic entities. If you cannot meet a deadline, inform the authority without undue delay and explain why.
When assessing your gap here, check whether your incident response runbooks include a classification step against the criteria in Delegated Regulation 2024/1772, a record of when the incident was detected and when it was classified, and a named individual responsible for regulatory notification. The notification obligation follows classification, not resolution.
Two clocks run in parallel. The 4-hour window starts at classification, but the 24-hour limit runs from the moment you became aware of the incident. Build the classification decision into your first-response playbook and keep a record of when and how it was made.
Every financial entity other than a microenterprise must establish, maintain and review a sound and comprehensive digital operational resilience testing programme as part of its ICT risk management framework (Article 24). The programme follows a risk-based approach that takes account of the proportionality criteria in Article 4(2).
Article 24(6) requires appropriate tests, at least yearly, of all ICT systems and applications supporting critical or important functions. Article 25 lists the tests a programme can draw on, including vulnerability assessments and scans, network security assessments, gap analyses, scenario-based tests, performance testing, end-to-end testing and penetration testing. These are options to select according to risk, not a list every entity must run every year.
Threat-led penetration testing (TLPT) under Article 26 applies only to financial entities identified by their competent authority, based on impact-related factors, financial stability concerns and the entity's ICT risk profile and maturity (Article 26(8)). Identified entities carry out TLPT at least every three years, although the authority can require a higher or lower frequency. The method is set out in Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190, in force since July 2025 and aligned with the TIBER-EU framework.
For your gap assessment on this pillar:
- List the testing your organisation has carried out in the past 12 months and against which systems.
- Check that every ICT system and application supporting critical or important functions was tested in that period.
- Check that the choice of tests is documented and justified by risk, rather than copied from a fixed list.
- If your competent authority has identified you for TLPT, confirm your last test date and when the next one is due.
- Review whether test results are documented, remediation actions are tracked and outcomes are reported to the management body.
Third-party risk is often where the largest gaps appear, because DORA's requirements go well beyond a supplier questionnaire.
The centrepiece is the Register of Information (RoI) under Article 28(3). It records all contractual arrangements for ICT services provided by ICT third-party service providers, at entity level and at sub-consolidated and consolidated levels, and distinguishes the arrangements that support critical or important functions. Financial entities report information from the register to their competent authority at least yearly and provide the full register on request. The templates are set by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2956; national authorities set the submission timetable.
The data is demanding to get right. In the ESAs' voluntary dry run in 2024, almost 1,000 financial entities submitted registers, and only 6.5% of the registers analysed passed all 116 data quality checks. If you have not started building your RoI, start now.
Beyond the RoI, your gap assessment on this pillar should cover:
- Due diligence. Do you carry out documented risk assessments before contracting ICT service providers, particularly those supporting critical or important functions? DORA expects assessment before the contract, not only periodic reviews afterwards.
- Contract terms. Article 30(2) sets minimum terms for every contract for ICT services, such as a clear description of the services, data processing locations, provisions on data protection, assistance with ICT incidents, cooperation with competent authorities and termination rights. Article 30(3) adds further terms for services supporting critical or important functions, including full service level descriptions, notice periods, participation in TLPT, unrestricted rights of access, inspection and audit, and exit strategies. See our guide to DORA Article 30 contract clauses.
- Subcontractors. Do you know who your providers of critical or important functions subcontract to? Your register and risk assessment need to reflect material subcontracting chains, not just direct supplier relationships.
- Concentration risk. Do you have several critical or important functions dependent on a single provider? Assess ICT concentration risk before entering into such arrangements (Article 29).
Article 45 allows financial entities to exchange cyber threat information and intelligence among themselves within trusted communities, provided the arrangements protect sensitive information and respect data protection and competition rules. Entities that join such an arrangement notify their competent authority.
Participation is voluntary, so not taking part is not a compliance gap and should not be scored as one. Record this area as not applicable or as an improvement opportunity. If you do participate, check that the competent authority has been notified and that the arrangement's conditions are documented.