Guide Compliance Financial Services

DORA gap analysis: how to assess and remediate compliance

The EU Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) has applied since 17 January 2025 and sets requirements for ICT risk management, incident reporting, resilience testing and ICT third-party risk. For a FinTech in scope, assessing compliance starts with identifying which obligations apply to your regulatory category, comparing existing controls against them and documenting the gaps. This guide sets out a practical method for organising evidence, assessing risk and building a remediation plan.

3 June 2026
Updated 18 November 2026
15 min read
Key takeaways
  • DORA has applied since 17 January 2025 to 20 categories of financial entity. There is no general grace period.
  • The five pillars are an explanatory model. Information sharing (Article 45) is voluntary and should not be scored as non-compliance.
  • An incident is major only if it affects critical services and either involves malicious unauthorised access that may lead to data losses or meets at least two other materiality thresholds.
  • The initial notification is due within 4 hours of classifying an incident as major and no later than 24 hours after becoming aware of it.
  • Testing is proportionate: systems supporting critical or important functions are tested at least yearly, and TLPT applies only to entities identified by their competent authority.

Start with a gap analysis, not a programme

Your instinct may be to start DORA compliance by drafting policies. That approach puts outputs before inputs. A gap analysis comes first: it identifies where you are exposed, which your policies cannot tell you.

DORA's requirements are often described as five pillars: ICT risk management, incident reporting, resilience testing, ICT third-party risk and information sharing. Treat this as an explanatory model rather than a legal structure. The obligations sit in specific articles of Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 and in the regulatory and implementing technical standards (RTS and ITS) adopted under it. The gap analysis maps what exists, compares it with the requirements that apply to your category of entity, and produces a prioritised list of actions. Without it, you build programmes around assumptions and discover the gaps when a supervisor asks.

20
categories of financial entity in Article 2(1), including payment institutions and crypto-asset service providers
4h
for the initial notification after classifying an incident as major, and no later than 24 hours after becoming aware of it
6.5%
of registers analysed in the ESAs' 2024 voluntary dry run passed all 116 data quality checks

Before the analysis: confirm your scope

DORA applies to financial entities in the 20 categories listed in Article 2(1), points (a) to (t). These include credit institutions, payment institutions, account information service providers, electronic money institutions, investment firms, crypto-asset service providers, insurance and reinsurance undertakings and crowdfunding service providers, among others. ICT third-party service providers appear separately in point (u). They are not financial entities, and those designated as critical fall under a separate oversight framework (Articles 31 to 44).

Scope is not always obvious for FinTechs. A company providing a payment initiation service is a payment institution. A company embedding insurance products into a platform may be an insurance intermediary, depending on its size and activities. A company that holds crypto-assets in custody for clients is a crypto-asset service provider under MiCA, which brings it within DORA's scope. Confirm your classification with your legal counsel before running a gap analysis. The classification determines which obligations apply and at what level of detail.

Two different mechanisms reduce the burden, and they are often confused. The proportionality principle in Article 4 applies to every financial entity: requirements are implemented in line with its size, overall risk profile and the nature, scale and complexity of its services, activities and operations. The simplified ICT risk management framework in Article 16 replaces Articles 5 to 15 only for the entity types listed there: small and non-interconnected investment firms, exempted payment institutions, exempted electronic money institutions, small institutions for occupational retirement provision and certain institutions exempted under Directive 2013/36/EU. Being a microenterprise (fewer than 10 persons and an annual turnover and/or balance sheet total of no more than EUR 2 million, Article 3(60)) brings some specific relief, for example a periodic rather than annual review of the framework, but it does not by itself place you under Article 16.

ICT suppliers and critical third-party providers

If you supply ICT services to EU financial entities, you are not a DORA financial entity yourself. Your clients remain responsible for managing their ICT third-party risk and will flow requirements down to you through contracts under Article 30. Only providers designated as critical by the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) are overseen directly, through a Lead Overseer; the ESAs published the first list of designated providers in November 2025. A supplier based outside the EU, for example in the UK or Brazil, should therefore expect contract clauses, audit rights and information requests from its financial-sector clients rather than direct supervision, unless it is designated.

How to record each gap

Record every requirement in the same format so findings can be compared, prioritised and evidenced. A simple register with these fields works well:

1
DORA reference
Article and paragraph, plus the relevant RTS or ITS (for example Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1772 for incident classification).
2
Requirement
The obligation in plain language.
3
Applicability
Applies, applies in simplified form, or not applicable, with the reason (entity category, Article 16, microenterprise status).
4
Expected evidence
What a supervisor would expect to see: a policy, register, test report, contract clause or management body minutes.
5
Current evidence
What exists today, with document references.
6
Assessment
Compliant, partially compliant, non-compliant or not applicable.
7
Gap
The specific difference between the requirement and the current state.
8
Risk
The operational and regulatory impact if the gap stays open.
9
Owner and deadline
A named person and a target completion date.

Assess both design and operation. A control can be adequately designed without operating effectively: a backup policy may meet the requirement on paper, but a failed restore test shows the control does not work in practice. Record these as separate findings.


1
ICT risk management framework
Articles 5 to 16 · Simplified framework for Article 16 entities

Every financial entity outside Article 16 must have a sound, comprehensive and well-documented ICT risk management framework (Article 6), covering identification, protection and prevention, detection, response and recovery, learning and evolving, and communication (Articles 8 to 14). The framework is reviewed at least once a year and after major ICT-related incidents (Article 6(5)); microenterprises review it periodically. Entities covered by Article 16 apply the simplified framework instead.

When assessing your gap on this pillar, work through the following questions:

  • Does a documented ICT risk management framework exist, or are your controls informal? Keep it version-controlled so you can show what changed, when and why.
  • Does it cover all the functions? Identification (asset inventory, mapping of critical or important functions), protection (access controls, patch management), detection (logging, monitoring), response and recovery (incident handling, backup and restore procedures, RTO/RPO targets).
  • Is the management body's role evidenced? Under Article 5(2), the management body defines, approves, oversees and is responsible for the implementation of all arrangements related to the framework, and bears ultimate responsibility for managing ICT risk. That does not mean every document needs separate board approval. It means you can show that the body has approved the framework and the elements Article 5 names, such as the digital operational resilience strategy and the policy on the use of ICT third-party services.
  • Is your asset inventory complete? You cannot protect what you have not catalogued. Map all ICT assets supporting critical or important functions, including those hosted by third parties.
  • Do your business continuity and recovery plans reflect current infrastructure, and have they been tested? Plans that reference retired systems or untested restore procedures will not stand up to review.

A common finding at this pillar is undocumented practice rather than missing controls: engineers know how the systems work, but there is no written framework a supervisor can assess.


2
ICT-related incident reporting
Articles 17 to 23 · All financial entities

Every financial entity must classify ICT-related incidents and report major ones to its competent authority (Articles 18 and 19). The classification criteria and materiality thresholds are set in Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1772. The test is narrower than many runbooks assume: no single threshold, such as two hours of downtime or impact in two Member States, makes an incident major on its own.

The regulation uses seven criteria (Articles 1 to 7), each with materiality thresholds in Article 9:

1
Clients, financial counterparts and transactions
For example, more than 10% of clients using the affected service, more than 100,000 clients, or more than 10% of the daily transactions in that service are affected.
2
Reputational impact
For example, media attention, repeated complaints from clients or counterparts, or an inability to meet regulatory requirements.
3
Duration and service downtime
The incident lasts longer than 24 hours, or service downtime exceeds 2 hours for ICT services supporting critical or important functions.
4
Geographical spread
The incident has an impact in two or more Member States.
5
Data losses
An impact on the availability, authenticity, integrity or confidentiality of data that harms business objectives or regulatory compliance, or a successful, malicious and unauthorised access to network and information systems that may result in data losses.
6
Criticality of services affected
The incident affects ICT services or systems supporting critical or important functions, regulated financial services, or involves successful, malicious and unauthorised access. This is the gateway condition.
7
Economic impact
Costs and losses exceed, or are likely to exceed, EUR 100,000.

Article 8 combines these criteria into a decision:

  1. Critical services affected? If the incident has not affected critical services (criterion 6), it is not major. Record it anyway, because it may count towards a recurring incident.
  2. Malicious unauthorised access? If critical services are affected and a successful, malicious and unauthorised access to network and information systems has occurred that may result in data losses, the incident is major.
  3. Two or more other thresholds? Otherwise, the incident is major only if at least two of the other materiality thresholds are met. One threshold alone is not enough.
  4. Recurring incidents. Incidents that are not major individually count as one major incident if they occurred at least twice within six months, share the same apparent root cause and together meet the test above. Assess this monthly. This rule does not apply to microenterprises or Article 16 entities.

Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/301 sets the reporting time limits in Article 5:

  • Initial notification: as early as possible, within 4 hours of classifying the incident as major and no later than 24 hours after becoming aware of it. If the incident is only classified as major more than 24 hours after you became aware of it, the initial notification is due within 4 hours of classification.
  • Intermediate report: within 72 hours of the initial notification, even if the status has not changed, with updated reports without undue delay and when regular activities have been recovered.
  • Final report: no later than one month after the latest updated intermediate report.

If a deadline falls on a weekend or a bank holiday in your Member State, you may submit by noon on the next working day. That extension does not apply to initial notifications and intermediate reports from credit institutions, central counterparties, operators of trading venues and financial entities identified as essential or important under NIS2, and competent authorities can withdraw it for other significant or systemic entities. If you cannot meet a deadline, inform the authority without undue delay and explain why.

When assessing your gap here, check whether your incident response runbooks include a classification step against the criteria in Delegated Regulation 2024/1772, a record of when the incident was detected and when it was classified, and a named individual responsible for regulatory notification. The notification obligation follows classification, not resolution.

Watch out

Two clocks run in parallel. The 4-hour window starts at classification, but the 24-hour limit runs from the moment you became aware of the incident. Build the classification decision into your first-response playbook and keep a record of when and how it was made.


3
Digital operational resilience testing
Articles 24 to 27 · Proportionate programme; TLPT only for identified entities

Every financial entity other than a microenterprise must establish, maintain and review a sound and comprehensive digital operational resilience testing programme as part of its ICT risk management framework (Article 24). The programme follows a risk-based approach that takes account of the proportionality criteria in Article 4(2).

Article 24(6) requires appropriate tests, at least yearly, of all ICT systems and applications supporting critical or important functions. Article 25 lists the tests a programme can draw on, including vulnerability assessments and scans, network security assessments, gap analyses, scenario-based tests, performance testing, end-to-end testing and penetration testing. These are options to select according to risk, not a list every entity must run every year.

Threat-led penetration testing (TLPT) under Article 26 applies only to financial entities identified by their competent authority, based on impact-related factors, financial stability concerns and the entity's ICT risk profile and maturity (Article 26(8)). Identified entities carry out TLPT at least every three years, although the authority can require a higher or lower frequency. The method is set out in Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190, in force since July 2025 and aligned with the TIBER-EU framework.

For your gap assessment on this pillar:

  • List the testing your organisation has carried out in the past 12 months and against which systems.
  • Check that every ICT system and application supporting critical or important functions was tested in that period.
  • Check that the choice of tests is documented and justified by risk, rather than copied from a fixed list.
  • If your competent authority has identified you for TLPT, confirm your last test date and when the next one is due.
  • Review whether test results are documented, remediation actions are tracked and outcomes are reported to the management body.

4
ICT third-party risk management
Articles 28 to 30 · All financial entities

Third-party risk is often where the largest gaps appear, because DORA's requirements go well beyond a supplier questionnaire.

The centrepiece is the Register of Information (RoI) under Article 28(3). It records all contractual arrangements for ICT services provided by ICT third-party service providers, at entity level and at sub-consolidated and consolidated levels, and distinguishes the arrangements that support critical or important functions. Financial entities report information from the register to their competent authority at least yearly and provide the full register on request. The templates are set by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2956; national authorities set the submission timetable.

The data is demanding to get right. In the ESAs' voluntary dry run in 2024, almost 1,000 financial entities submitted registers, and only 6.5% of the registers analysed passed all 116 data quality checks. If you have not started building your RoI, start now.

Beyond the RoI, your gap assessment on this pillar should cover:

  • Due diligence. Do you carry out documented risk assessments before contracting ICT service providers, particularly those supporting critical or important functions? DORA expects assessment before the contract, not only periodic reviews afterwards.
  • Contract terms. Article 30(2) sets minimum terms for every contract for ICT services, such as a clear description of the services, data processing locations, provisions on data protection, assistance with ICT incidents, cooperation with competent authorities and termination rights. Article 30(3) adds further terms for services supporting critical or important functions, including full service level descriptions, notice periods, participation in TLPT, unrestricted rights of access, inspection and audit, and exit strategies. See our guide to DORA Article 30 contract clauses.
  • Subcontractors. Do you know who your providers of critical or important functions subcontract to? Your register and risk assessment need to reflect material subcontracting chains, not just direct supplier relationships.
  • Concentration risk. Do you have several critical or important functions dependent on a single provider? Assess ICT concentration risk before entering into such arrangements (Article 29).

5
Information sharing
Article 45 · Voluntary

Article 45 allows financial entities to exchange cyber threat information and intelligence among themselves within trusted communities, provided the arrangements protect sensitive information and respect data protection and competition rules. Entities that join such an arrangement notify their competent authority.

Participation is voluntary, so not taking part is not a compliance gap and should not be scored as one. Record this area as not applicable or as an improvement opportunity. If you do participate, check that the competent authority has been notified and that the arrangement's conditions are documented.


Building the remediation roadmap

A gap analysis produces findings across all of the areas above. Rather than following a fixed order, rate each gap on a few factors:

  • Operational risk. How likely the gap is to cause or worsen a disruption.
  • Criticality. Whether it affects critical or important functions.
  • Regulatory exposure. Whether a deadline or reporting obligation depends on it.
  • Compensating controls. What reduces the risk while the gap stays open.
  • Effort and lead time. How long the fix takes and whether it depends on third parties.

Then run the main workstreams in parallel rather than one after another:

  1. Time-bound obligations. Incident classification and reporting must work now, because a major incident can happen at any time. Put the classification step, reporting templates and named roles in place early.
  2. The most critical technical gaps. A failed restore test or untested systems supporting critical functions carry operational risk that documentation will not fix. Address them alongside the documentation work, not after it.
  3. Third-party contracts and the RoI. Renegotiating contracts and collecting register data depend on suppliers and take lead time you do not control, so start them early.
  4. Documenting existing practice. Writing down controls that already work is quick and closes design gaps, but it only counts if those controls also operate effectively.
  5. Testing aligned to your cycle. If your annual testing is due in three months, plan the testing remediation to feed into that cycle rather than scheduling a standalone assessment.

Give each action an owner, a target completion date and a status, and report progress to the management body. Under Article 5 the management body bears ultimate responsibility for managing ICT risk, so it should see the gap analysis results and oversee the remediation plan. How formally it approves individual documents depends on your governance arrangements.

DORA has applied since 17 January 2025 and there is no general grace period. Supervisory priorities differ between authorities and sectors, but an entity that can show a completed gap analysis, an evidence-based assessment and a remediation plan with owners and target dates is in a stronger position than one that cannot.

Frequently asked questions

Who does DORA apply to?

DORA (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554) applies to the 20 categories of financial entity listed in Article 2(1), including credit institutions, payment and electronic money institutions, investment firms, insurance undertakings and crypto-asset service providers. It has applied since 17 January 2025. ICT third-party service providers are not financial entities: they are affected through their contracts with financial entities, and those designated as critical are overseen directly by the ESAs. The proportionality principle in Article 4 applies to every financial entity, while the simplified ICT risk management framework in Article 16 is limited to the entity types listed there.

What are the five pillars of DORA?

DORA is commonly described through five pillars: ICT risk management (Articles 5 to 16), ICT-related incident management and reporting (Articles 17 to 23), digital operational resilience testing (Articles 24 to 27), ICT third-party risk management (Articles 28 to 44) and information sharing (Article 45). This is an explanatory model rather than a legal structure. The first four contain mandatory requirements; information sharing is voluntary and should not be scored as non-compliance in a gap analysis.

What makes an ICT incident major under DORA?

Under Article 8 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1772, an incident is major if it has affected critical services and either a successful, malicious and unauthorised access to network and information systems has occurred that may result in data losses, or at least two other materiality thresholds are met. Those thresholds cover clients, financial counterparts and transactions, reputational impact, duration and service downtime, geographical spread, data losses and economic impact. Under Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/301, the initial notification is due within 4 hours of classification and no later than 24 hours after becoming aware of the incident, the intermediate report within 72 hours of the initial notification, and the final report within one month of the latest updated intermediate report.

Does every financial entity under DORA need to do Threat-Led Penetration Testing?

No. TLPT under Article 26 applies only to financial entities identified by their competent authority. Those entities carry out TLPT at least every three years, unless the authority sets a different frequency, following Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190, which is aligned with TIBER-EU. Other financial entities, apart from microenterprises, still need a proportionate testing programme under Article 24, in which ICT systems and applications supporting critical or important functions are tested at least yearly.

What is the DORA Register of Information?

The Register of Information (RoI) under Article 28(3) records all contractual arrangements for ICT services provided by ICT third-party service providers, at entity, sub-consolidated and consolidated level, and distinguishes those supporting critical or important functions. Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2956 sets the templates, and entities report information from the register to their competent authority at least yearly. In the ESAs' 2024 voluntary dry run, only 6.5% of the registers analysed passed all 116 data quality checks.

Ryland Deakin
About the author
Lead Consultant, Cyvra · CISM · CompTIA Security+ · MCP

Ryland has delivered cybersecurity, compliance, and IT management programmes for regulated organisations across the UK and the Netherlands for over 20 years. View full profile

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