- Protect admin accounts and recovery functions first, then email and every user identity, then remote access, finance, SaaS and legacy applications
- A high MFA registration rate is not coverage: check policy exclusions, allowed methods, legacy authentication paths and the sign-in logs
- SMS-only MFA on high-value accounts, uncovered users, legacy protocols and weak recovery create the largest gaps
- Security Defaults give every tenant a free MFA baseline; Conditional Access, which needs Entra ID P1, controls when MFA is required and which methods count
- ISO 27001 A.8.5, Cyber Essentials and NIS2 Article 21 all address strong authentication; exported policies and sign-in logs are your evidence
This page covers how to implement MFA: the order to roll it out, the mistakes that leave gaps, the Microsoft 365 and Entra ID settings to get right, and how MFA maps to compliance frameworks. For what MFA is and how the methods compare, see our guide to multi-factor authentication.
Where to start: a deployment sequence
The goal is MFA for every user and every application, including sign-ins from your corporate network. Sequence the rollout so the accounts that can do the most damage are protected first.
1. Admin accounts and recovery functions
Global and privileged administrators, helpdesk staff who can reset passwords or MFA methods, and anyone who can change authentication settings hold the keys to everything else. Require phishing-resistant MFA for these roles and secure the reset processes at the same time: an attacker who can talk the helpdesk into resetting a user's MFA does not need to defeat it. Set up at least two emergency access (break-glass) accounts, protected with strong methods such as FIDO2 keys, documented, and monitored with an alert on every sign-in.
2. Email and every user identity
Business email is the master key to almost everything else. Password resets for other accounts go to email, and attackers who compromise a Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace account can read mail, redirect payment instructions, and access connected applications. Enable MFA on email for every employee, contractor and guest or external identity that can reach company data, without exception.
In Microsoft 365, the fastest baseline is Security Defaults; organisations that need more control use Conditional Access. Do not exempt the office network: a compromised device or a phishing session from inside the building is just as dangerous. Trusted (named) locations can inform specific contextual policies, but should not become blanket MFA exemptions.
3. VPN and remote access
A compromised VPN or remote desktop credential puts an attacker inside your network with the same access as a legitimate employee. Mainstream remote access solutions, such as Cisco AnyConnect, Fortinet FortiClient, Palo Alto GlobalProtect and Windows Remote Desktop Gateway, support RADIUS-based MFA or direct integration with identity providers like Entra ID.
4. Finance, SaaS and developer access
Online banking, payment platforms, and accounting software such as Exact, Twinfield, or Xero contain the data attackers target in business email compromise. Enable MFA for every user who can initiate or approve payments, and use phishing-resistant methods for finance approvers and executives. Then extend coverage to CRM, HR, file storage, source code repositories, cloud consoles, DNS management and domain registrar accounts. Registrar accounts are high-value and often overlooked: an attacker who controls them can redirect your entire domain.
5. Legacy applications and non-human identities
Applications that cannot use modern authentication need a decision: upgrade them, place them behind a gateway or proxy that enforces MFA, or retire them. Service accounts, application registrations and automation cannot answer an MFA prompt, so protect them differently: managed identities or certificate credentials instead of passwords, least privilege, a named owner, and regular review.
6. Test recovery and measure real coverage
Test lost-device recovery and emergency access before you need them. Then check what is actually enforced. A high MFA registration rate is not coverage: review policy exclusions, which methods are still allowed, any legacy authentication paths, and whether the sign-in logs show MFA was actually satisfied for each application.
Keep these ready for auditors, insurers and your own reviews:
- Authentication methods policy and Conditional Access configuration, exported
- User and application coverage, including every exclusion and its justification
- Sign-in logs showing MFA satisfied, and any legacy or single-factor sign-ins
- Inventory of privileged identities and the authentication strength each requires
- Recovery and emergency access procedures, with evidence of the last test
Once MFA is in place across all users and systems, it sits inside a broader programme. A cybersecurity roadmap sequences MFA alongside patch management, network segmentation, backups, and access controls so each control reinforces the others.
Common deployment mistakes
An MFA deployment with gaps still gives attackers a path in. These are the four mistakes that create the largest ones.
SMS-only MFA on high-value accounts
Some organisations enable MFA and then accept SMS as the only factor option because it requires no app installation. For standard user accounts this is a trade-off. For executives, finance staff, IT administrators, and anyone with access to sensitive data, it is an unacceptable risk. Segment your MFA requirements: require phishing-resistant methods for privileged and high-risk users, accept an authenticator app with number matching as a minimum for standard users, and remove SMS for accounts that hold real power.
Not covering all users
MFA policies that exclude contractor accounts, guests, shared service accounts, or "temporary" users create entry points. Attackers look for accounts outside the main policy scope. In Entra ID, check your Conditional Access policies for exclusions and audit them quarterly. Every excluded account should have a documented, time-limited business justification.
Allowing legacy authentication protocols
Legacy (basic) authentication sends a username and password with every request and cannot carry an MFA challenge. Microsoft retired basic authentication in Exchange Online for Exchange ActiveSync, POP, IMAP, EWS, Remote PowerShell and Outlook clients from October 2022. SMTP AUTH follows separate rules: basic authentication for it is still available, and Microsoft's revised timeline disables it by default for existing tenants at the end of December 2026, with a final removal date still to be announced; check Microsoft's current announcement. Do not assume a protocol bypasses MFA because of its name: IMAP and POP can use OAuth, which is subject to Conditional Access. Check the authentication method actually used in the Entra ID sign-in logs, then block legacy authentication with a Conditional Access policy targeting the Exchange ActiveSync and "Other clients" conditions.
No secure recovery plan
Without a recovery path, a lost phone or key means pressure on IT to bypass controls, and weak recovery is an attack path in its own right. Entra ID has no generic backup codes. Instead, let users register more than one approved method, issue a Temporary Access Pass under controlled conditions when someone needs to re-enrol, require robust identity verification at the helpdesk before any MFA reset, and keep protected, monitored emergency access accounts for tenant-wide lockouts. Where a third-party service offers recovery codes, store them securely, for example in a company password manager with restricted access.
Microsoft 365 and Entra ID: specific guidance
Most Cyvra clients run Microsoft 365. The settings below address the key risks.
Security Defaults. In the Microsoft Entra admin center, open Entra ID, then Overview, then Properties, then Manage security defaults. Security Defaults requires every user to register for MFA, requires MFA for administrators, prompts other users for MFA when necessary, and blocks legacy authentication protocols. It is available in every tenant at no extra cost, but cannot be used alongside Conditional Access policies.
Conditional Access (requires Entra ID P1, included in Microsoft 365 E3, E5 and Business Premium). Conditional Access gives you granular control over when and how MFA is required. Key policies to create: require MFA for all users and all resources, including from trusted networks; require a phishing-resistant authentication strength for administrator roles; block legacy authentication; and require a compliant or Entra-joined device for access to sensitive data. Secure Score in the Microsoft Defender portal shows which recommended identity controls are in place.
Authentication methods policy. This is separate from Conditional Access: it controls which methods users can register and use, while Conditional Access controls when MFA is required and, through authentication strengths, which methods satisfy a policy. Number matching already applies to all Authenticator push notifications, so there is nothing to enable there. Review which methods each user group can register. Restrict SMS and voice to groups where you have reviewed and accepted the trade-off, enable passkeys (FIDO2) and Temporary Access Pass, and pair this with a Conditional Access authentication strength that requires phishing-resistant MFA for administrators.
Privileged Identity Management (PIM). PIM requires Microsoft Entra ID P2 or Microsoft Entra ID Governance licences. Microsoft 365 E5 includes Entra ID P2; Microsoft 365 E3 and Business Premium include P1 only, so PIM needs an add-on there. PIM makes admin roles eligible rather than permanently active: admins activate a role for a set period, which can require MFA, justification or approval, and each activation is logged. How far this reduces standing privilege depends on configuration; emergency access accounts and roles left permanently assigned remain.
MFA turns most stolen passwords into a dead end. Phishing-resistant MFA also closes the real-time phishing route that SMS, codes and push still leave open.
MFA and compliance frameworks
MFA appears by name or direct implication in the major security frameworks relevant to SMEs.
ISO 27001:2022, Annex A.8.5 (Secure Authentication) requires secure authentication technologies and procedures based on access restrictions and your access control policy. The ISO 27002 guidance for this control points to stronger methods such as MFA where the classification of the information justifies it. A.8.2 (Privileged Access Rights) requires privileged access to be restricted and managed, which auditors commonly expect to include MFA on all admin accounts.
Cyber Essentials (UK). Cyber Essentials requires MFA on cloud services for users and administrators wherever the service offers it. Under the question set introduced in April 2026, missing MFA on a cloud service that supports it means the assessment cannot be passed. Cyber Essentials Plus adds a technical audit of the configuration.
NIS2 (EU, Article 21). Article 21(2)(j) lists "the use of multi-factor authentication or continuous authentication solutions", among other measures, "where appropriate", as part of the cybersecurity risk-management measures for essential and important entities. NIS2 does not mandate MFA on every system, but it is one of the few controls the directive names. UK businesses with operations in EU member states may fall in scope there.
GDPR. UK GDPR and EU GDPR do not mandate MFA by name, but Recital 83 and Article 32 require "appropriate technical and organisational measures" to protect personal data. The ICO has cited missing MFA as a factor in breach enforcement action. Following a breach, the absence of MFA on the compromised account makes it harder to argue that you took appropriate technical measures.
The evidence checklist above maps directly to A.8.5. Keep the exported policy definitions (JSON) with your Statement of Applicability; sign-in logs showing MFA satisfied demonstrate the control is operating, not just configured.