Guide Identity Security

Passkeys and Passwordless: The Practical Guide for IT and Security Leaders

Passkeys replace passwords with a key pair that phishing sites cannot use. This guide explains device-bound and synced passkeys, how they resist phishing, what they don't protect against, and what to plan before you roll them out.

31 July 2026
Updated 10 November 2026
8 min read
Key takeaways
  • A passkey is a FIDO2 credential. The server stores only a public key, so a breach of the server's credential store gives an attacker nothing to sign in with.
  • Device-bound passkeys stay on one authenticator. Synced passkeys are copied, end-to-end encrypted, to the user's other devices through a provider such as iCloud Keychain or Google Password Manager.
  • Passkeys resist phishing because the signature is bound to the website's domain. They do not stop session token theft, weak account recovery, unauthorised enrolment or a compromised device.
  • For MFA-level assurance, require user verification (a PIN or biometric) and check it on the server. A single tap is not enough.

What a passkey is

A passkey is a FIDO2 credential based on public-key cryptography. When a user registers, the authenticator creates a key pair for that one website or service. The public key goes to the server. The private key stays with the authenticator. At sign-in the server sends a random challenge, the authenticator signs it with the private key, and the server checks the signature against the stored public key. No shared secret crosses the network and none sits in the server's database.

Where the private key lives depends on the type of passkey, and that difference drives most enterprise decisions.

Device-bound passkeys stay on a single authenticator and cannot be exported. Examples are a FIDO2 hardware security key, a Microsoft Entra passkey stored in the Windows Hello container on one PC, and a passkey in the Microsoft Authenticator app. If the device is lost, the passkey is gone with it.

Synced passkeys are copied to the user's other devices through a passkey provider, such as iCloud Keychain, Google Password Manager or a third-party password manager. The sync is end-to-end encrypted, but the private key does leave the original device, and its security now depends on the provider account and every device signed in to it.

QuestionDevice-bound passkeySynced passkey
Where the private key livesOne authenticator; cannot be exportedCopied across the user's devices through the provider's encrypted sync
Lost deviceCredential lost; the user needs another registered authenticator or a recovery processStill available on the user's other devices
Attestation (proof of authenticator model)Usually available, for example on FIDO2 security keysNot provided
NIST SP 800-63B-4Can meet AAL3 with a suitable authenticatorAccepted up to AAL2, with conditions on the sync provider
Typical fitAdministrators, privileged and high-risk users, regulated rolesGeneral workforce and consumers, where convenience and recovery matter most

Why passwords keep failing

39%
of breaches involved credential abuse at some stage of the attack (Verizon DBIR 2026)
31%
of breaches started with vulnerability exploitation, now the leading initial access vector (Verizon DBIR 2026)

A password is a shared secret: the user knows it and the server stores something derived from it. Attackers can take it from either side. Phishing pages and infostealer malware collect it from users, database breaches expose the stored hashes, and adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) proxies capture it while the user types it into what looks like the real login page.

Credential abuse still appears in about four in ten breaches, even though exploiting vulnerabilities has overtaken it as the most common way in. Passkeys address the first problem. They do nothing for an unpatched VPN appliance.

One-time codes and push approvals narrow the gap but can still be relayed: the user completes the challenge, the proxy forwards it to the real service, and the attacker keeps the session cookie. Our article on how attackers bypass MFA covers these techniques.

How passkeys resist phishing

Passkeys run on two standards. WebAuthn, from the W3C, defines how a website or app asks the browser or operating system to create and use a credential. CTAP, from the FIDO Alliance, defines how the browser or operating system talks to an external authenticator over USB, NFC or Bluetooth.

Phishing resistance comes from origin binding. Each passkey is registered to the service's domain (the relying party ID), and at sign-in the browser, not the user, decides which domain is asking. The signed response contains the challenge, the origin of the page that made the request and a hash of the relying party ID. A phishing site on a lookalike domain gets no usable signature, and a relayed response fails because the origin does not match. That protection only holds if the server actually validates the challenge, origin, relying party ID hash and signature.

User presence versus user verification

The authenticator also reports two flags. User presence (UP) shows that someone touched the authenticator. User verification (UV) shows that the authenticator checked a PIN or biometric locally. A passkey with UV combines something you have with something you know or are, which is why it can replace a password plus a second factor. With only UP it is a single factor. For workforce MFA, set user verification to "required" and reject any response where the UV flag is not set, as the OWASP Passkey Security Cheat Sheet and NIST SP 800-63B-4 expect.

NIST classification note

NIST SP 800-63B-4 treats authenticators that bind their output to the verifier's domain, such as FIDO2 passkeys, as phishing-resistant; one-time codes and push notifications are not. AAL3 also requires a non-exportable private key, so synced passkeys can reach AAL2 but not AAL3. CISA likewise names FIDO/WebAuthn and PKI-based smart cards as the widely available forms of phishing-resistant MFA.

What passkeys don't solve

Passkeys remove phishable secrets from the login step. Several risks remain, and an honest rollout plan names them:

  • Session token theft. Infostealer malware or an AitM attack on a service that still allows weaker methods can steal the session cookie after a legitimate sign-in.
  • Weak recovery. If an attacker can persuade the service desk to reset an account, or use an email reset link, the passkey is bypassed rather than broken.
  • Unauthorised registration. An attacker who controls a session or a Temporary Access Pass can register their own passkey and keep access.
  • Compromised device or sync account. Malware on an unlocked device can act as the user, and a takeover of the iCloud or Google account behind synced passkeys can expose them.
  • Fallback methods. If passwords, SMS or push approval still work for the same account, attackers will use those instead.

Passkeys on Microsoft, Apple and Google

Microsoft has several options that are easy to confuse: Windows Hello for Business for signing in to managed PCs, Microsoft Entra passkeys stored on a single Windows device, passkeys in the Microsoft Authenticator app and FIDO2 security keys. All of these are device-bound. Since March 2026, passkey profiles in Entra ID let administrators decide per group whether synced passkeys are allowed. For consumer accounts, Microsoft made new Microsoft accounts passwordless by default in 2025.

Apple syncs passkeys through iCloud Keychain across devices signed in to the same Apple Account, from iOS 16 and macOS Ventura. Google syncs them through Google Password Manager on Android 9 and later and Chrome on desktop, and Google Workspace supports passkeys and security keys for workforce sign-in.

Cross-device sign-in lets a user sign in on a laptop with the passkey on their phone: the laptop shows a QR code, Bluetooth confirms the phone is nearby, and the private key never leaves the phone. FIDO2 security keys connect over USB or NFC, keep the private key in hardware and lock after repeated wrong PINs. They suit administrators and people who move between shared workstations.

Rolling passkeys out in your organisation

Turning passkeys on is quick. Making them the only way in takes planning, and most projects stall on the same points:

  • Applications and accounts outside single sign-on that still accept passwords.
  • Deciding which user groups may use synced passkeys and which need attested, device-bound authenticators.
  • Securing passkey registration, so an attacker cannot add their own.
  • Recovery when a user loses their only device. Register at least two authenticators per user and test lost-device scenarios before you remove password fallback.
  • Enforcement: enabling passkeys does not stop weaker methods. In Microsoft Entra ID that takes Conditional Access with a phishing-resistant authentication strength.

Our companion guide, Rolling out passkeys with Microsoft Entra ID, covers each of these step by step, with a user-group policy table, a recovery playbook, licensing and the metrics to track.

Biometrics and data protection

With passkeys, the fingerprint or face match happens on the user's device. The biometric template stays in the device's secure hardware and is never sent to the identity provider or to your organisation. The server receives a signature and a flag saying verification took place.

Under UK GDPR, biometric data used to identify someone is special category data. Because the template stays on the device and your organisation never receives it, a standard passkey deployment does not, in general, mean you are processing employees' biometric data. You still process personal data about registered authenticators, sign-in logs and device details, so cover these in your records and privacy notice. Offer a PIN as an alternative to biometrics, and consider a data protection impact assessment if you introduce any central biometric system. The ICO's guidance on biometric recognition explains when the stricter rules apply.

Ryland Deakin
About the author
Lead Consultant, Cyvra · CISM · CompTIA Security+ · MCP

Ryland has delivered cybersecurity, compliance, and IT management programmes for regulated organisations across the UK and the Netherlands for over 20 years. View full profile

Common questions

Are passkeys the same as a password manager?

No. A password manager stores and fills passwords, which still travel to the server and can still be phished. A passkey replaces the password with a key pair, and only a signature is sent. Many password managers can now also store synced passkeys, which is where the confusion comes from.

Are all passkeys synced to the cloud?

No. Synced passkeys are copied between a user's devices through a provider such as iCloud Keychain or Google Password Manager. Device-bound passkeys stay on one authenticator: a FIDO2 security key, a Microsoft Entra passkey on Windows, or a passkey in Microsoft Authenticator.

Can passkeys replace MFA?

Yes, when user verification is required. A passkey unlocked with a PIN or biometric combines possession of the authenticator with something the user knows or is, so it counts as multi-factor in one step. If only user presence (a tap) is checked, it is a single factor. Configure user verification as required and validate the flag on the server.

What is the difference between FIDO2, WebAuthn, CTAP and passkeys?

FIDO2 is the umbrella name for the W3C WebAuthn standard and the FIDO Alliance CTAP protocol. WebAuthn is how websites and apps ask for a credential; CTAP is how a browser or operating system talks to an external authenticator such as a security key or phone. "Passkey" is the user-facing name for a FIDO2 discoverable credential, whether synced or device-bound.

Sources

Sources

Identity Security Review

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We review your MFA methods, Conditional Access policies and recovery process against current attack techniques, and give you a prioritised passkey rollout plan.

Disclaimer: This article is for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal, regulatory, or professional advice. Cyvra makes no warranty as to the accuracy or completeness of this content, which may not reflect the most current regulatory developments. Readers should seek independent legal and regulatory advice appropriate to their specific circumstances. Cyvra accepts no liability for any loss arising from reliance on this content.