- Microsoft has closed several of the old gaps: security defaults block legacy authentication on many newer tenants, and Basic authentication is retired for most Exchange Online protocols. Older tenants, exceptions and custom configurations can still leave gaps open.
- Security defaults give you MFA and a legacy authentication block without extra licensing. Conditional Access needs Entra ID P1, and policies based on sign-in or user risk need Entra ID P2.
- Authenticator number matching cuts accidental push approvals, but it is not phishing-resistant. Give administrators FIDO2 security keys, passkeys or Windows Hello for Business.
- Sharing defaults differ by site type. OneDrive and the organisation-level setting start at "Anyone", so check both the site settings and the default link type.
- Audit logging is not on by default for Business Basic, Business Standard or Business Premium. Turn it on before an incident, because it cannot record events retrospectively.
What Microsoft now protects by default
Microsoft 365 is less exposed out of the box than it was a few years ago. Security defaults, a free baseline in Microsoft Entra ID, require every user to register for MFA, require MFA for administrators and block sign-ins that use legacy authentication protocols. Microsoft is rolling them out to new tenants at creation, and tenants created on or after 22 October 2019 may already have them on.
Exchange Online has also changed. Microsoft began permanently disabling Basic authentication (a username and password sent with each request) for Exchange ActiveSync, POP, IMAP, Exchange Web Services and several other protocols in October 2022. SMTP AUTH was excluded from that programme and runs on a separate timetable, covered in the legacy authentication section below. Since 2024 and 2025, Microsoft has also required MFA for sign-ins to its admin portals, including the Microsoft Entra admin center, the Intune admin center, the Azure portal and the Microsoft 365 admin center.
None of this makes a tenant secure by itself. Security defaults are often switched off when an organisation moves to Conditional Access or hits a compatibility problem, and older tenants may never have had them. The gaps we still find tend to sit elsewhere: administrators who read email with their privileged account, exceptions created years ago for a scanner or an integration, broad external sharing, third-party applications with excessive permissions, and audit logging that nobody checked. Your first task is to establish which controls are active in your own tenant, rather than assume the defaults still apply.
MFA: choose the enforcement model that fits
There are three ways to enforce MFA in Microsoft 365, and the right one depends on your needs and your licences.
- Security defaults. Suitable for organisations that need baseline MFA and a legacy authentication block but no custom rules. No extra licence is required. You cannot make exceptions or target specific apps, groups or locations.
- Conditional Access. Policies that grant or block access based on the user, the application, the device, the location and other conditions. Requires Entra ID P1, which is included in Microsoft 365 Business Premium, E3 and E5. Security defaults and Conditional Access cannot run together, so switch off security defaults only once your Conditional Access policies cover the same ground.
- Risk-based policies. Conditional Access that responds to sign-in risk and user risk calculated by Microsoft Entra ID Protection. Requires Entra ID P2, which is included in Microsoft 365 E5 but not in Business Premium or E3.
Per-user MFA, configured through the older MFA settings page, is the weakest of the options to manage. It applies account by account, is easy to leave inconsistent, and Microsoft recommends moving to security defaults or Conditional Access instead.
Microsoft Authenticator with number matching reduces the risk of a user approving a push notification they did not start. It does not stop an adversary-in-the-middle phishing page that relays the sign-in in real time. For administrators and other high-risk accounts, use phishing-resistant methods: FIDO2 security keys, passkeys, Windows Hello for Business or certificate-based authentication. SMS and voice calls are the weakest methods. Move users to stronger methods before you remove them.
Conditional Access: a baseline for licensed tenants
If you have Entra ID P1, Conditional Access lets you set rules that security defaults cannot express. A sensible starting set for most organisations covers:
- Require MFA for all users, with stronger authentication strengths for administrator roles.
- Block legacy authentication for all users, once you have confirmed which clients still depend on it.
- Require a compliant or hybrid-joined device for access to corporate data. This needs Intune or a compatible device management service. See the endpoint security guide for device management detail.
- Respond to risky sign-ins and risky users by requiring stronger authentication or a password change, or by blocking access. Requires Entra ID P2.
Run each new policy in report-only mode first and review the results before you enforce it. Exclude your emergency access accounts from policies that could block them, keep a record of every exclusion and the reason for it, and have a rollback plan for policies that touch every user.
| Capability | Typical licensing requirement |
|---|---|
| Security defaults | Free tier of Entra ID; no extra licence |
| Conditional Access | Entra ID P1 (included in Business Premium, E3 and E5) |
| Sign-in risk and user risk policies | Entra ID P2 (included in E5) |
| Privileged Identity Management | Entra ID P2 or Entra ID Governance (P2 included in E5) |
| Device compliance in Conditional Access | Intune (included in Business Premium, E3 and E5) |
| Defender for Office 365 Plan 1 | Included in Business Premium; available as an add-on for other plans |
| Audit (Premium) and longer log retention | E5 or a compliance add-on |
Microsoft changes its bundles from time to time. Check the current Microsoft service descriptions for the licences assigned to the users each policy covers.
Admin account hygiene
Global Administrator is the most powerful role in a Microsoft 365 tenant. Holders can reset passwords, change security settings, grant themselves access to data and manage other administrators. A compromised Global Administrator account gives an attacker very broad control of the tenant.
Start with least privilege. Many administrative tasks need a narrower role: Exchange Administrator for mail flow, User Administrator for account management, Helpdesk Administrator for password resets. Keep the number of Global Administrators small and review the list regularly.
Dedicated admin accounts
Give administrative roles to separate accounts with no mailbox and no everyday productivity apps, and use them only for administrative work. A phishing email then reaches the administrator's normal account, which holds no privileged role. A separate admin account does not necessarily need a Microsoft 365 productivity licence to hold an admin role. Security features you apply to it, such as Conditional Access or Privileged Identity Management, still need the relevant Entra licence.
Privileged Identity Management
Privileged Identity Management (PIM) lets you make roles eligible rather than permanently assigned. An administrator activates the role only when needed, for a limited period. Depending on how you configure each role, activation can require MFA, a written justification and approval from another person. PIM records each activation for later review. It requires Entra ID P2 or Entra ID Governance licensing. PIM does not replace good role design: an organisation can make ten people eligible for Global Administrator and still have a privilege problem.
Emergency access accounts
Microsoft recommends two cloud-only emergency access accounts (often called break-glass accounts) for the case where a Conditional Access or MFA misconfiguration locks out your administrators. Use the following safeguards:
- Create them on the tenant's .onmicrosoft.com domain, so they do not depend on federation or an on-premises identity service.
- Assign the Global Administrator role permanently and actively. Do not make it PIM-eligible.
- Protect them with phishing-resistant methods such as FIDO2 security keys or passkeys. Admin portals now require MFA, so exclusion from Conditional Access does not mean no authentication.
- Exclude them from Conditional Access policies that could block their sign-in.
- Store the keys and credentials securely, in separate locations, with a record of who can retrieve them.
- Alert on every sign-in, and review every use afterwards.
- Test that the accounts can sign in at regular intervals, for example every quarter, and after major policy changes.
Blocking legacy authentication
The real risk is Basic authentication, where an application sends a username and password with each request and cannot complete an MFA challenge. The protocols themselves are a separate question. Microsoft has supported OAuth 2.0 for POP, IMAP and SMTP AUTH in Exchange Online since 2020, so a client that supports modern authentication can use them safely. Microsoft's own analysis found that more than 99% of password spray attacks and more than 97% of credential stuffing attacks it observed used legacy authentication.
With Basic authentication already retired for most Exchange Online protocols, the remaining exposure usually sits in a few places:
- SMTP AUTH. Basic authentication for SMTP AUTH client submission still works until the end of December 2026, when Microsoft plans to disable it by default for existing tenants. Administrators will still be able to re-enable it, and Microsoft has said it will announce a final removal date in the second half of 2027. Printers, scanners and line-of-business applications that send email often rely on it.
- Exceptions. Accounts or groups excluded from security defaults or Conditional Access to keep an older system working.
- Older clients and integrations, including applications outside Exchange Online that still authenticate with a password alone.
Review the Entra sign-in logs, filtered by client app, to see which legacy clients still sign in. Check whether SMTP AUTH is enabled at organisation and mailbox level in Exchange Online. Migrate legitimate applications to OAuth or another supported sending method, and test business-critical workflows before you switch anything off. If you use Conditional Access, run the legacy authentication block in report-only mode first and keep a rollback procedure. In some organisations this is a handful of devices; in others with many older systems, it is a project in its own right.
Email security: Defender for Office 365
All Exchange Online plans include Exchange Online Protection (EOP), which filters spam and malware and includes basic anti-phishing and anti-spoofing protection. Defender for Office 365 Plan 1, included in Business Premium and available as an add-on for other plans, adds:
- Safe Links, which checks URLs at the time of click rather than only at delivery. In email, Safe Links can rewrite URLs so the check happens when the user clicks. In Microsoft Teams, it checks the URL when the user clicks, without rewriting the link shown in the message. Safe Links also covers supported Office apps.
- Safe Attachments, which opens attachments in a sandbox before delivery and blocks files that behave maliciously.
- Additional anti-phishing settings, including impersonation protection for named users and domains and mailbox intelligence.
A licence does not prove protection. Check which policies are enabled, which users, groups and domains they cover, and who investigates detections. Microsoft's Standard and Strict preset security policies are a reasonable starting point for most organisations. No filtering service stops every phishing email, so reporting and response still matter.
SPF, DKIM and DMARC
Configure SPF, DKIM and DMARC for every domain you send from, including third-party services that send email on your behalf. These records help receiving servers decide whether a message using your domain is authorised. Start DMARC in monitoring mode, read the reports until you have identified every legitimate sender, then move step by step to quarantine or reject. Domain authentication does not stop lookalike domains, so it complements the anti-phishing controls above rather than replacing them.
Applications, consent and service identities
Not every Microsoft 365 compromise starts with a stolen password. An attacker can persuade a user to grant a malicious application access to their mailbox or files, and that access continues after a password reset. Applications and service principals with broad permissions or forgotten credentials create similar risks. MFA for users does not cover any of this.
- Review the enterprise applications and app registrations in Entra ID, and the permissions each one holds.
- Restrict user consent, for example to verified publishers and low-risk permissions, and set up an admin consent workflow for everything else.
- Remove applications with no business owner or purpose.
- Monitor new consent grants, new application credentials and changes to service principals.
This matters most for organisations that connect Microsoft 365 to CRM, HR and finance systems, Power Automate flows and third-party SaaS tools.
External sharing settings
SharePoint and OneDrive sharing works at two levels. The organisation-level setting sets the most permissive option any site can use, and it starts at "Anyone", which allows links that work without sign-in. Each site then has its own setting, which can be the same or more restrictive. Microsoft's defaults by site type are:
- OneDrive: Anyone.
- Sites connected to Microsoft 365 groups, including Teams: New and existing guests, if group owners may add people from outside the organisation; otherwise existing guests only.
- Communication sites, classic sites and modern sites without a group: only people in your organisation. The root communication site is the exception and defaults to Anyone.
A separate setting controls which link type is selected by default when a user clicks Share. Review the organisation-level setting, the setting on sensitive sites, the default link type, link expiry, any allowed or blocked domain lists, and the Entra ID external collaboration settings. In Teams, review external access and guest access, and who can bypass the meeting lobby.
Changing the policy does not clean up what is already shared. Review existing external sharing on sensitive sites as well. If you have Entra ID P2 or Entra ID Governance, access reviews can ask owners to confirm whether guests still need access.
Audit logging and alerting
The audit log records user and admin activity across Microsoft 365 services. It is the main source of evidence when you investigate a compromised account. Without it, you cannot reconstruct what an attacker did.
Microsoft turns auditing on by default for most Microsoft 365 organisations. Business Basic, Business Standard and Business Premium are the exception: auditing is not on by default for these licences, and the same applies to unmanaged tenants on free enterprise trials. Check the status in Microsoft Purview, or run Get-AdminAuditLogConfig | Format-List UnifiedAuditLogIngestionEnabled in Exchange Online PowerShell. Enabling it today does not recover events from before it was switched on.
Audit (Standard) keeps records for 180 days. Audit (Premium), included in E5, keeps Exchange, SharePoint and Entra records for one year by default, and longer with an add-on licence. Export to a SIEM if you need a longer history.
Logs alone do not detect anything. Decide which events need an alert, such as admin role changes, new mailbox forwarding or inbox rules, bulk file downloads, Conditional Access changes and new application consents. Then decide who receives each alert and what they do with it. Microsoft's built-in alert policies cover some of these. Defender XDR, Microsoft Sentinel or another SIEM can correlate events across sources. Test critical alerts periodically: generate the event, confirm the alert arrives, and confirm someone acts on it.
Recovering a compromised account
Resetting the password is the start of a recovery. An attacker who has had access to a Microsoft 365 account may have left other ways back in. Your recovery procedure should cover:
- Revoking active sessions and refresh tokens, and resetting the password.
- Reviewing registered MFA methods and removing any the user did not add.
- Checking mailbox forwarding and inbox rules that hide, delete or redirect messages.
- Reviewing OAuth consents the account has granted, and new application credentials.
- Checking for role changes, new accounts and changes to Conditional Access policies.
- Searching the audit log for what the account accessed, sent or shared.
Build these steps into your incident response plan so your team does not have to work them out during an incident.
Microsoft Secure Score
Microsoft Secure Score, in the Microsoft Defender portal, measures how many of Microsoft's recommended security actions your tenant has adopted, with a prioritised list of improvements. It is a useful starting point for a small IT team and a simple way to track progress over time.
It is not a measure of how likely you are to be breached. The score depends on which products you license and which recommendations apply to you, and some recommendations will not fit your organisation. Prioritise actions by risk and operational impact, record the reasons for any recommendation you choose not to follow, and review progress every quarter.
Implementation order
Some of these controls can lock users out or break integrations if you apply them all at once. Work in stages, test policies before broad enforcement, and keep evidence of each step.
| Phase | Action | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Baseline | Inventory users, admin roles, licences, security defaults and existing policies | Exported configuration with a named owner |
| 2. Privileged access | Dedicated admin accounts, least-privilege roles, phishing-resistant MFA, emergency access accounts | Role list, sign-in tests, emergency access test |
| 3. Authentication | Confirm modern authentication and find remaining legacy dependencies | Sign-in log review, application compatibility tests |
| 4. Access policies | Security defaults or Conditional Access, depending on licensing | Report-only results, test cases, documented exclusions |
| 5. Collaboration | Review sharing levels, default link types, guest access and sensitive sites | Sharing policy review and exposure findings |
| 6. Email | Defender policies, SPF, DKIM and DMARC | Policy reports, DMARC reports |
| 7. Applications | Review consent grants, service principals and integrations | Approved application inventory |
| 8. Detection | Confirm auditing, retention and alert routing | Test events and response procedure |
| 9. Review | Prioritise remaining gaps and track Secure Score | Signed-off remediation plan and exceptions |
The CIS Microsoft 365 Foundations Benchmark is a useful reference for detailed settings. Passing it does not guarantee that a tenant is secure, but it gives you a recognised checklist to compare against.
If your organisation uses Microsoft 365 Copilot, review its data access and governance settings separately. Our article on Microsoft Copilot governance and data exposure covers those gaps. Organisations that rely heavily on the Microsoft stack should also consider their Microsoft dependency risks, and a cybersecurity roadmap puts identity, endpoint, network and incident response work in a single sequence.